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“Does aid work?” This question has dominated develop-
ment literature for the past half a century and yet still the an-
swer seems unclear. There are numerous examples of countries
that seem to have used aid to good eﬀect in terms of helping
generate economic growth: Taiwan in the 1950s, Botswana
and the Republic of Korea in the 1960s, Bolivia and Ghana
in the 1980s, and Uganda and Vietnam in the 1990s. Cross-
country studies have provided formal empirical evidence on
the positive eﬀect of aid on growth (Burnside & Dollar,
2000; Dalgaard, Hansen, & Tarp, 2004; Hansen & Tarp,
2001; Minoiu & Reddy, 2010). In addition, according to
Collier and Dollar (2002), Oﬃcial Development Assistance
(ODA) alone brings 10 million people out of poverty each
year. On the other hand, there is formal and anecdotal evi-
dence that suggests that, in many cases, and in many countries,
aid does not work (Bobba & Powell, 2007; Boone, 1994).
Along with the successful stories mentioned above, there are
many countries that have received a large amount of foreign
aid but performed poorly in terms of economic growth, for in-
stance, Zambia, Zaire, Niger, Jamaica, Nepal, among others
(Mosley, Hudson, & Horrell, 1987) 1 while countries, such as
China, Algeria, and Costa Rica received little aid but have,
so far, performed well according to a number of diﬀerent
development indicators.
The often disappointing impact of foreign aid has been
attributed to a number of diﬀerent factors in the literature,
including corruption, ineﬃciencies and bureaucratic failures
in the recipient countries (Alesina & Dollar, 2002), inappropri-
ate conditionality and aid tying 2 adopted by the donor coun-
tries (OECD, 1994), the support for foreign aid among
voters in donor countries (Chong & Gradstein, 2008), and lack
of coordination between donors and between donors and1281recipients (Arne, 2006; Berthe´lemy, 2006b). Apart from these
factors, disappointing aid impact might also be due to the
inappropriate manner in which donors allocate their aid.
There is one constant in the history of aid—the development
objectives of foreign aid are often distorted by donors’ com-
mercial, strategic, and political motives, 3 regardless of donor
agencies’ mission statements.
If foreign aid partly (or indeed perhaps only) responds to
donor’s strategic, political, and economic consideration, there
is indeed no reason for foreign aid to be eﬀective in promoting
development of the recipients (Berthe´lemy & Tichit, 2004).
This is not to say that humanitarian motives and donor’s stra-
tegic, political, and economic motives are contradictory, but if
recipient need does not ﬁgure highly in the aid allocation deci-
sion it is likely that the impact of aid in promoting growth and
development will be reduced.
The presence of donors’ strategic, economic, and political
motivations is likely to distort the aid transfer process and
diminish the eﬃciency gains from the resource reallocation.
For example, if aid is used to support so-called “friendly re-
gimes” which are corrupt or authoritarian with ruling elites
showing little interest in broad national development, there
may be little correlation between aid and development. 4 Sec-
ondly, the conditionality attached to the aid often embodies
elements of strategic, economic, and political motivations of
donors, which may diverge from recipients’ own development
1282 WORLD DEVELOPMENTstrategies. The prescriptions of the IMF, World Bank, and
other bilateral donors, in the form of stabilization and struc-
tural adjustment programs (SAPs) are often based on pro-
globalization and market liberalization ideologies (Mosley
et al., 1995). Although such aid may promote the spread of do-
nor-supported capitalism and open up the recipient’s market
to donor commercial interests, the developmental impact of
program loans remains controversial. Strategic- and politi-
cally-oriented transfer may also bring volatility to the recipi-
ent’s capital market. As Hayter and Watson (1985, p. 214)
alleged, it is common that bilateral donors and the World
Bank “intervene, or attempt to intervene, in the policies of a
country with political objectives, but cease to lend when their
eﬀorts have little chance of succeeding.” Such volatility and
uncertainty of aid receipts may well undermine aid eﬀective-
ness.
Given the importance of the above debates and controver-
sies, this paper seeks to investigate the factors that inﬂuence
the aid allocations of bilateral donors and multilateral organi-
zations. There are already a large number of empirical studies
on aid allocation, McGillivray and White (1993), Berthe´lemy
(2006a) and Dollar and Levin (2006) provide excellent surveys
and methodological critique of such work. Our study can be
distinguished from existing studies in three respects. First of
all, it is based on an explicit economic model. Secondly, a pa-
nel data approach is adopted with explicit treatment of recipi-
ent and year eﬀects. The dataset covers a large number of
recipients (153 countries) and a relatively long period of time
(1966–2008). Thirdly, the study is motivated by a particular
subset of questions. The international hegemony of the United
States and the replacement of the Cold War by the War on
Terror mean that the allocation of United States aid may well
be particularly motivated by strategic donor interest rather
than recipient need. Indeed, recent material on the US Agency
for International Development’s (USAID) website seems quite
forthright about this:
“The new century has brought new threats to US security and new
challenges and opportunities for the national interest. . .Pre-empting
threats and disasters is not the only reason that fostering development
is in the U.S. interest. Successful development abroad generated diﬀuse
beneﬁts. It opens new more dynamic markets for U.S. goods and ser-
vices. It generates more secure, promising environments for U.S.
investment. It creates zones of order and peace where Americans can
travel, study, exchange and do business safely. And it produces
allies. . .”
http://www.usaid.gov/fani/overview (p. 2).
In March 2002, when the then US President George W.
Bush proposed the ﬁrst signiﬁcant increase in US development
assistance in a decade, he justiﬁed this at the United Nations
Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico:
“We ﬁght against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.”
The U.S. Congress shares this view too.
“A potential threat facing the United Sates after the Cold War may be
spread of mass destruction, especially combined with political instabil-
ity. . . .a brief survey of the world’s trouble spots showed a fairly strik-
ing correlation between economic malaise on the one hand and
domestic unrest and political instability on the other. If the United
States can address those problems by using its foreign aid to help to
create economic opportunities and invest in human capital, then the
chance of conﬂict may be reduced.”
Congressional Budget Oﬃce study (1997).
Given these statements, it is interesting to see whether the
allocation of the US aid to date shows greater responsivenessto donor self-interest than that of other bilateral and multilat-
eral donors. If so, this historical practice may well become
more dominant in the future given the changing nature of
USAID’s mission statement in the light of the War on Terror.
In order to investigate this we make a comparison between the
US aid and other bilateral aid.
There are also contrasting views on the allocation of multi-
lateral aid. A standard line of argument, supported by a num-
ber of empirical studies (e.g., Maizels & Nissanke, 1984;
Rodrik, 1995), is that multilateral organizations, because they
do not represent the interests of one particular nation, are
more likely to respond to recipient need than donor interest
in their aid allocation. On the other hand, it has been argued
that two of the Washington-based multilateral organizations,
the IMF and the World Bank, predominantly respond to the
interests of the US administration in terms of both aid alloca-
tion and aid conditionality (Barro & Lee, 2005; Frey &
Schneider, 1986; Thacker, 1999). A more recent study in
World Development, Harrigan, Wang, & El-Said (2006) also
ﬁnds evidence that aid ﬂows to the Middle East and North
Africa from the IMF and World Bank were inﬂuenced by
the geo-political interests of the United States. In order to
investigate this further we now compare the US aid with other
bilateral aid and aid from the multilaterals (we include all ma-
jor multilaterals, not just the World Bank and IMF).2. THE AID ALLOCATION LITERATURE: A BRIEF
REVIEW
Development economists have always been interested in is-
sues concerning the allocative patterns of foreign aid and its
determinants. This has generated a large body of literature
(see Berthe´lemy, 2006a; Dollar & Levin, 2006; McGillivray
& White, 1993). Studies can be categorized into three broad
approaches: explanatory, descriptive, and prescriptive analy-
ses (McGillivray & White, 1993). The explanatory studies
attempt to explain the observed allocation of aid; the descrip-
tive studies seek to describe or evaluate aid allocation against
normative criteria; and the prescriptive studies aim to pre-
scribe the inter-recipient allocation of aid by calculating the
amounts of aid each recipient should receive. For the purpose
of this paper, we focus on the ﬁrst group of studies, which has
dominated the area so far.
Explanatory aid allocation studies can be categorized
according to how they envisage the aid allocation process
and hence the type of equations they estimate. McGillivray
and White (1993) identify six non-mutually exclusive types
of study: recipient need/donor interest; hybrid; bias; develop-
mental; administrative/incremental and limited dependent var-
iable. We review the diﬀerent approaches below in order to
help us decide upon and justify our own chosen methodology.
Recipient need/donor interest studies estimate two separate
models of aid allocation—one containing variables to reﬂect
recipient need and one containing variables to reﬂect donor
interest (early well-known examples include Maizels &
Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay & Little, 1977, 1978, 1979). The re-
cipient need model is derived from the moral and humanitar-
ian argument that absolutely poverty is intolerable and from
the economic argument that if the marginal utility of income
diminishes, total welfare will be increased by a redistribution
of income from the rich to the poor. Hence, there is a moral
imperative for governments of developed countries to provide
aid because resources have been unequally distributed and/or
there has been historical exploitation of poor country re-
sources. As Chandrasekhar (1965, p. 5) argued, foreign aid
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it is ultimately a moral problem . . . it is a positive factor in the
struggle of millions of human beings against the age-old ene-
mies of hunger, poverty, disease, and ignorance.” The Pearson
Commission on International Development in 1969 (Commis-
sion on International Development, 1969) emphasized the
moral and humanitarian motives for providing aid, and the
Brandt Commission in 1980 and the Earth Summit in 2002
reiterated this view.
By contrast, the donor interest model is based on the
hypothesis that donors seek to take advantage of the strategic
and commercial gains they can derive from aid and hence allo-
cate aid to pursue their self-interest. From the late 1960s, a
number of scholars (e.g., Frank, 1969; Hayter, 1971, 1981;
Hensman, 1971; Jale´e, 1968) have argued that aid can be used
to promote donors’ own economic and foreign policy interests
and to exercise their political power. The developed countries
can exercise their ﬁnancial muscles directly via their bilateral
agencies as well as indirectly through multilateral organiza-
tions and international ﬁnancial institutions (Riddell, 1987).
Hence, the ultimate purpose for giving aid is to help spread
donor values and ideas, such as capitalism or more recently
globalization, and to perform the express functions of stabiliz-
ing pro-Western governments, for example, Egypt and
Philippines, and containing the spread of communism, for
example, South Korea and Vietnam. In general, it is found
that the donor interest model performs better than the recipi-
ent need model.
A criticism of the donor interest/recipient need approach is
that when the models are constructed, they are based
separately either on recipient need or donor interest (e.g.,
McKinlay & Little, 1978, 1979; Wittkopf, 1973). There is no
ground for assuming that the aggregate allocation of aid is
purely based on just one set of motives, that is, either donor
interest or recipient need. As a result, there is model speciﬁca-
tion bias due to omitted variables. The correct option should
be to adopt the so-called “hybrid” models, which estimate
an aid allocation equation containing two sets of variables
reﬂecting both the recipient’s needs and donor’s interests (as
done by Bowles (1987), Feeny and McGillivray (2008), Levitt
(1968), Poe and Sirirangsi (1993), and Wittkopf (1972)). This
type of model has tended to dominate the literature so far.
There are a small number of studies adopting the “biases”
approach. These focus on two biases in aid allocation: the pop-
ulation bias and the middle-income bias. The population bias
exists when there is an inverse relationship between aid per
capita and size of the recipient measured by population. There
are a number of possible explanations for the existence of this
bias. First of all, specialization in the production process
caused by economies of scale induces small countries to trade
a high percentage of their specialized output and import a great
deal of their non-specialized products. If business groups and
sections of the donor bureaucracy concerned with trade pro-
motion are particularly active, small countries with a high per-
centage of trade shares are likely to be favored by donors.
Second, the population bias can be explained by donors’
geo-political interests. As population increases, the marginal
political beneﬁt to the donor decreases (Dowling & Hiemenz,
1985). As Isenman (1976, p. 632) notes “. . .a very small coun-
try can potentially help or hurt a donor by its vote in UN or its
voice in other international fora.” Since aid allocation is a
process established on a nation-by-nation basis rather than a
population basis, it oﬀers the small country a bargaining
advantage. Consequently, this would push donors to spread
their aid across a large number of countries in order to maxi-
mize as many good relations with recipients as possible (Arvin& Drewes, 2001). 5 Small countries are also chosen by the do-
nors, since the cost of exerting political leverage is lower in less
populous countries and small countries may be more likely to
accept the conditionality attached to the aid programs. As a
result, aid dependency may be higher in small countries than
in large countries. Third, it has been argued that the capacity
of large countries to absorb additional amounts of aid is ques-
tionable as technical and administrative expertise often present
bottlenecks to eﬀective utilization of additional aid (Dowling
& Hiemenz, 1985).
The middle-income bias refers to the observation that
poorer countries tend to receive less aid, however, once a cer-
tain income threshold has been reached, aid and income per
capita become positively correlated (Alesina & Dollar, 2002;
Dowling & Hiemenz, 1985; Isenman, 1976). The middle-
income bias may creep in mainly due to the economic and
political importance of the middle-income countries (e.g.,
bilateral trade is one consideration) or their relatively well-
developed bureaucracies which can administer the aid and
make the aid more eﬀective (Dowling & Hiemenz, 1985). 6
Bureaucratic/incremental models hypothesize that marginal
incrementalism or bureaucratic inertia inﬂuence aid allocation
and hence estimate allocation equations containing variables
such as the preceding year’s allocations (Feeny & McGillivray
2008; Gang & Khan, 1990; Gulhati & Nallari, 1988). Develop-
mental models (e.g., Davenport, 1970) use developmental vari-
ables alone to explain aid allocation—as such they are similar
to recipient need models.
Since the 1990s, two advances have emerged in the aid allo-
cation literature. One is the panel data approach in which the
relationship between donor and recipient is captured by the
ﬁxed-eﬀects coeﬃcients. The other is the recognition of
the truncated or censored nature of the dependent variable
(the Limited Dependent Variable Approach) in aid allocation
studies.
Trumbull and Wall (1994) argue that existing studies based
on cross-sectional data do not account for the heterogeneity of
recipient countries, and that they are of limited use if there are
unobserved recipient-speciﬁc variables that correlate with one
or more of the explanatory variables. Variables of this type
could be those geopolitical factors, such as recipients’ colonial
histories, their strategic value to donors, their political regimes
or their geographical location. A panel dataset possesses sev-
eral major advantages over either cross-sectional or time series
data. For example, it gives more informative data, more vari-
ability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of
freedom, and higher eﬃciency (Greene, 2007). Moreover, the
groupwise heteroskedasticity can be substantially reduced.
The panel data can also be used for the limited dependent var-
iable approach (LDVA), such as the Probit and Tobit models.
Most of the LDVA can be applied in a panel data setting when
the random-eﬀects are introduced. For the Count and Tobit
models, ﬁxed-eﬀects can be introduced as well (Greene,
2007). 7
Limited dependent variable models address the issue of
country eligibility for aid, which is an important part of the
aid allocation decision. McGillivray (2003) argues, given the
censored nature of the dependent variable in aid allocation
which is not properly recognized in the existing empirical liter-
ature, that it is likely that most studies have reported biased re-
sults, consequently, much of popular opinion on aid allocation
may well be misleading. A more appropriate approach would
be to use limited dependent variable techniques such as sample
selection models. These portray aid allocation as a two stage
process, that is, “Yes/no” (stage one deciding on eligibility)
and “if yes, how much” (stage two). Such models can help to
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amounts allocated to those deemed eligible. Examples of this
approach include Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), Dudley
and Montmarquette (1976), McGillivray and Oczkowski
(1991), and Poe (1992). These studies treat aid allocation as a
utility maximizing problem and often use Probit and then
OLS to explain the eligibility and amount decisions, respec-
tively.
More recent studies have adopted a Tobit model, for exam-
ple, Alesina and Dollar (2002), McGillivray and White (1993)
and Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher (2007). This model
treats the decision on eligibility and the decision on amounts
as a single simultaneous process. However, there are a number
of potential diﬃculties with this approach. The Tobit model
relies crucially on the assumptions of normality and homoske-
dasticity in the underlying latent variable model. If any of
these fail to hold, the Tobit model is meaningless (Greene,
2007). Moreover, the Tobit model imposes the condition that
the relationship generating the ones and zeros (eligible or inel-
igible) is the same as the process that produces the positive
values (in terms of allocated amounts), which may not be
the case in the aid allocation process. One example is the eﬀect
of population, which may have a positive eﬀect on eligibility
due to the administrative costs (Dudley & Montmarquette,
1976) and a negative eﬀect on the amount of aid allocated
due to the population bias. This would require the coeﬃcient
on population to have diﬀerent signs, which is impossible in
the Tobit model because they are the same coeﬃcient (Greene,
2007).
In this regard, it is argued in the literature that Heckman’s
two-step method may be appropriate. The ﬁrst step is to esti-
mate a Probit model which determines the eligibility of receiv-
ing aid, and in the second step, a linear model explaining aid
commitments is estimated based only on strictly positive
observations and the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the ﬁrst
step to correct selection bias. However, Lewis (1986, p. 59)
notes that estimates using this approach seem to exhibit much
greater variability across studies than those using simpler tech-
niques. This may be due to a number of factors. First of all,
the parameters of the model appear to be sensitive to the pres-
ence of heteroskedasticity or non-normality. Secondly, it is dif-
ﬁcult to ﬁnd variables that aﬀect the probability of receiving
aid and do not enter the model in the second step.
The above survey of the empirical aid allocation literature
illustrates the simple truth, as McGillivray and White (1993)
have argued, that the aid allocation process is complex and
no one knows exactly how it works. In the real world, do-
nor–recipient relations are likely to involve the interplay of
bureaucratic, political, commercial, developmental, and other
factors, and these are rarely suﬃciently appreciated and ac-
counted for in many aid allocation models. 8 As a result there
are huge variations in the models employed in aid allocation
studies, and as such it is unsurprising that the results generated
from existing work also vary and sometimes even contradict
each other.
The above critique of aid allocation studies has helped shape
the methodological approach we employ in our study. Firstly,
we feel it is important to formulate a theoretical model of the
aid allocation process before drawing on empirical arguments.
Few papers have done this with the exception of Dudley and
Montmarquette (1976), Trumbull and Wall (1994) and Feeny
and McGillivray (2008). The model formulates, albeit in a lim-
ited way, our view of what constitute the key factors in a com-
plex real world aid allocation process. From this we derive an
econometric model for testing which is essentially a hybridmodel incorporating both donor interest and recipient need.
We use a panel dataset covering the period 1966–2008 for
153 countries. We are mainly concerned with countries that re-
ceive a positive amount of aid. However, in light of the above
discussion of truncated variables we also run the Probit and
Tobit regressions using the same set of variables to see if the
ﬁndings are consistent with the regressions that used only
the positive values of aid per capita.3. THE MODEL
In order to model the aid allocation process, the ﬁrst step
should be to deﬁne the nature of aid. According to the
Keynesian argument for international assistance, developing
countries accept foreign aid because most of them cannot gen-
erate suﬃcient savings to relieve investment bottlenecks.
Developed donor countries may also gain from such transfer
when the rates of return on aid are higher than the marginal
productivity of capital in their own countries and lower than
the marginal productivity of capital in the developing recipient
countries. As such, foreign aid can be termed an international
public good because the donor countries can beneﬁt from the
total welfare raised by aid. The implication is that donor coun-
tries can beneﬁt from its social returns while the recipients
beneﬁt from its private returns as well as its social returns.
The aid allocation model that follows is based on the assump-
tion that donors derive welfare or utility from the positive im-
pacts of aid in the recipient country and they aim to maximize
this welfare. 9
Supposing donors believe that ODA is put to good use by
recipient governments, each year a donor country allocates
its ODA budget among the m recipients, with the objective
of maximizing the total impact of ODA to the recipients.
Let H be the sum of the impacts of the donor’s aid on its
own welfare, the problem faced by the donor is 10
Maximize H ¼
Xm
j¼1
hjHj ¼
Xm
j¼1
hjnjhjðnj; aj; yj; pjÞ ð1Þ
whereHj is the subjectively measured impact on the recipient j;
hj is the subjectively measured impact on an individual citizen
in the recipient j (identical within the country); nj is the popu-
lation of the recipient j; aj is the aid per capita received by the
recipient j; yj is the GDP per capita of the recipient j; pj is an
index measure of the policy environment in the recipient j; hj
is a rate of return to the donor from the impact on the recipi-
ent j. This is determined by economic, political, and other link-
ages between the donor and recipient.
The above model is based on the following assumptions. yj
appears in the equation since, other things being equal, the
poorer the recipient country, the more aid is needed and the
more beneﬁt the country will derive from an additional unit
of aid. pj is included based on the hypothesis that the better
the policy instruments the recipient government employs, the
more beneﬁt the country will derive from an additional unit
of aid (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). In giving aid, the recipient’s
population nj can be important. If two countries have the same
level of yj, it is the smaller country that will have the larger
ﬁnancial gap in per capita terms such that the impact of aid
per capita will decrease with population size. In summary,
the impact of aid on each individual in the recipient j will be
an increasing function of aid per capita and a decreasing func-
tion of j’s GDP per capita and of population. The donor coun-
try can only beneﬁt from a proportion of this impact and the
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linkages. These assumptions can be represented as follows:
@hj
@aj
> 0;
@hj
@yj
< 0;
@hj
@pj
> 0;
@hj
@nj
< 0
The donor has ﬁve options to increase the total impact of its
foreign aid, including increasing the magnitude of aid, switch-
ing funds from a relatively rich country to a relatively poor
country, from a country with bad policies to one with good
policies, from a less populous country to a more populous
country, 11 or from a country with less linkages with itself to
one with more linkages with itself.
We can specify the aid impact function on recipient j as the
following:
Hj ¼ hj  nj ¼
aaj p
d
j
nbj y
c
j
 nj; 0 < a; b; c; d < 1; aþ b
< 1; aþ c < 1; ð2Þ
The assumption of a + c < 1 rules out the possibility that each
individual can beneﬁt from giving up one unit of income for an
additional unit of aid (holding other things constant) 12 and
the assumption of a + b < 1 indicates that there is an eﬀect
of economies of scale. 13
Finally, the donor country is limited by its budget constraintXm
j¼1
ajnj ¼ B ð3Þ
Substituting (3) and (5) into (1) and then solving the constraint
problem faced by the donor
Maximize L ¼
Xm
j¼1
hjnj
aaj p
d
j
nbj y
c
j
þ k B
Xm
j¼1
ajnj
 !
0 < a; b; c; d < 1; aþ b < 1; aþ c < 1
The ﬁrst order conditions are
@H
@aj
¼
Xm
j¼1
ahjaa1j p
d
j
nb1j y
c
j

Xm
j¼1
knj ¼ 0 0 < a; b; c; d < 1;
aþ b < 1; aþ c < 1 ð4Þ
@H
@k
¼ B
Xm
j¼1
ajnj ¼ 0 ð5Þ
Equating (6) and (7) gives the optimal allocation of aid per ca-
pita for each recipient
aj ¼
ahjpdj
knbj y
c
j
" #1=ð1aÞ
ð6Þ
Taking the log transformation, we have
log aj ¼ 1
1 a log aþ
1
1 a log hj þ
1
1 a log k
þ b
1 a log nj þ
c
1 a log yj þ
d
1 a pj;
j ¼ 1; . . . ;m ð7Þ
Eqn. (8) provides the basic model, which will be estimated
and tested in the next section. However, before proceeding
with the regression analysis, we ﬁrst elaborate on a number
of issues concerning the representation of aid impact in our
model.(a) Donor beneﬁts versus recipient beneﬁts
Consider a scenario where all the recipient countries are
homogenous in terms of population, GDP per capita, and pol-
icy environment. A donor can choose between two approaches
to its aid allocation: one is to consider linkages hj between do-
nor and recipient, the other is to ignore such linkages. The im-
pact of the ﬁrst strategy on recipients can vary, some recipients
will beneﬁt more and others less. Note @hj
@aj
> 0 and 0 < a < 1
(yj = yk, nj = nk and pj = pk, j, k 2 m). The recipients as a
whole would gain less when the donor adopts the ﬁrst strategy
since resources may be shifted from more productive countries
to less productive countries. If all recipients are equally impor-
tant (in terms of linkages) to the world as a whole but vary in
terms of their importance to a speciﬁc donor, the world as a
whole would also gain less when the ﬁrst strategy is adopted
by the donor.
(b) Comparison among donors
In the previous section, only one donor is considered. Now,
we assume that there are two identical donors, but they diﬀer
in their linkages to the recipients. One donor has the same le-
vel of linkages as those applied to the world with all the recip-
ients, the other’s linkages with recipients varies. In order to
maximize the total impact of its aid allocation on its own wel-
fare, the ﬁrst donor would simply distribute its aid equally
among recipients, and the second would put more emphasis
on the linkages. It is clear that if both donors try to achieve
their objectives, the beneﬁt to the world generated from the
ﬁrst donor’s aid is larger than that from the second. As a re-
sult, in the empirical literature on aid allocation, when com-
parisons are made between donors based on recipient need
model, it is likely that R2s are higher for donors, such as
Denmark and Sweden, but lower for the United States since
the recipient need model ﬁts well with the Nordic countries’
emphasis on the developmental and humanitarian needs of
developing countries. It is also likely that the standard devia-
tion of the ﬁxed-eﬀects coeﬃcient would be lower for the for-
mer and higher for the latter when the ﬁxed-eﬀects panel
approach is adopted.4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
Eqn. (8) can only be tested when one can ﬁnd an appropri-
ate measure for each variable. However, there is no generally
agreed measurement for the linkage between donor and recipi-
ent (hj). The linkage could be colonial ties, strategic alliance,
cultural similarity, proximity in terms of geographic location,
commercial links, and so on. In order to overcome this prob-
lem, following Trumbull and Wall (1994), we adopt the panel
data approach and introduce ﬁxed-eﬀects to take account of
the donor–recipient linkage. 14
By introducing a time subscript, adding the error term and
replacing the parameters with coeﬃcients in Eqn. (8), we ob-
tain the following equation for estimation:
log ajt ¼ b0 þ bj þ bt þ b1 log njt þ b2 log yjt þ b3pjt þ ejt;
j ¼ 1; . . . ;m; t ¼ 1; . . . T ð8Þ
where bt ¼ 11a log kt, bj ¼ 11a log hj; b1 ¼ b1a, b2 ¼ c1a, b3 ¼ d1a
and kt is the equilibrium shadow value of aid. Note1 < b1 < 0, 1 < b2 < 0 and b3 > 0, Since, 0 < a, b, d,
c < 1; a + b < 1 and a + b < 1. In Eqn. (8), ajt, njt, and pjt
1286 WORLD DEVELOPMENTare country j’s ODA commitment per capita in year t, j’s pop-
ulation in year t and j’s average growth rate of year t  2 to t,
respectively. Note our measurement of the policy environment
is diﬀerent from the one employed by Burnside and
Dollar (2000), which is a composite index of inﬂation, budget
surplus, and openness based on the growth regression. Their
index only covers three policy instruments and considers
short-run eﬀects; while ours is an ex-post measure of the
medium term policy environment (proxied by the growth
performance). 15
The ODA commitment data are obtained from the OECD’s
online database while data for the other variables are taken
from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) CD-
ROM. Detailed deﬁnitions of variables and data sources are
given in Appendix 1 and descriptive statistics and the correla-
tion matrix for the variables are given in Appendix 2. The
dataset used covers 153 countries over the period 1966–2008.
Using Eqn. (8), we investigate and contrast the allocation of
USA bilateral aid and other major donors including Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, and United Kingdom to see whether the
United States, given its geo-political hegemony, displays spe-
ciﬁc behavior in its aid allocation. We also contrast bilateral
ODA with multilateral ODA allocations to see if there are dif-
ferences in allocation. One might question whether Eqn. (8) is
applicable to the multilateral aid since it is based on a model
that only takes account of one donor’s behavior. However,
if coupled with the assumptions that all the multilateral aid
donors use the same subjective measure of the impact of
ODA to a recipient and each recipient is equally important
to all the donors within the group (see Trumball and Wall
(1994)) Eqn. (8) is readily applicable. 16Table 1. Estimation resul
Multilateral aid United States Canada
OLS without ﬁxed eﬀects
AVEGDPG 0.013*** 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
LGDPPC 0.651*** 0.182*** 0.286***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.026)
LPOP 0.566*** 0.436*** 0.445***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.016)
Adj. R2 0.460 0.148 0.172
Least squares with recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
AVEGDPG 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
LGDPPC 0.428*** 1.012*** 0.607***
(0.064) (0.085) (0.095)
LPOP 1.372*** 0.950*** 0.289
(0.172) (0.248) (0.264)
Recipient ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.662 0.619 0.545
Diagnostic test statistics
LR1 2309.708*** 3344.577*** 2457.859**
LR2 216.064*** 333.014*** 313.640***
LM 6059.44*** 10491.52*** 8040.97***
HS 52.88*** 72.81*** 24.17***
N 4,503 3,915 3,792
Notes: 1. Recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported. 2. Standard errors are
diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 4. The likelihoo
versus OLS, high value favors two way eﬀects model over OLS. 5. The likeliho
versus recipient ﬁxed eﬀects only, high value favors two-way eﬀects model over r
test the recipient and year eﬀects versus OLS, high value favors random (&ﬁxed
eﬀects versus random eﬀects, high value favors ﬁxed eﬀects over random eﬀecIt is well understood that generally, a panel dataset can be
estimated in three ways, depending on whether the individual
cross-sectional eﬀects are considered to be constant, ﬁxed, or
random. The corresponding statistical models are OLS, ﬁxed
eﬀects (FE), or random eﬀects (RE). These three models have
their own advantages and disadvantages. The OLS model is
simple, but the assumption that the individual-speciﬁc eﬀects
do not diﬀer is often too strong to hold in most cases. The
FE model allows variation in these eﬀects and does not impose
the strict condition that regressors are uncorrelated with ﬁxed
eﬀects, but including dummy variables as extra regressors
make it less eﬃcient than the RE model because of the loss
of degrees freedom. Finally, the RE model relegates the indi-
vidual-speciﬁc eﬀects into the error term and assumes that they
are uncorrelated with the regressors. Violation of this assump-
tion may cause the RE model to produce biased and inconsis-
tent estimates. There is no rule of thumb for choosing among
the three models. The choice is largely dependent on three fac-
tors: the model speciﬁcation, the sample size, and the statisti-
cal testing.
Three tests are usually applied to identify the best statistical
model. The likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is applied to test the
ﬁxed eﬀects model versus OLS model, with a high value favor-
ing country eﬀects over OLS. The Lagrange multiplier (LM)
statistic is applied to test the country and year random
(&ﬁxed) eﬀects model versus OLS model, with a high value
favoring random (&ﬁxed) eﬀects model over OLS model.
The Hausman statistic is applied to test ﬁxed eﬀects model ver-
sus random eﬀects model, and a high value favors ﬁxed eﬀects
model over random eﬀects model. These test statistics are sup-
plied at the bottom of relevant tables.ts based on Eqn. (8)
France Italy Japan United Kingdom
0.026*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.045***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
0.200*** -0.285*** 0.163*** 0.452***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027)
0.538*** 0.069*** 0.297*** 0.667***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
0.192 0.047 0.074 0.274
0.019*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
0.201*** 0.510*** 0.166* 0.837***
(0.075) (0.125) (0.099) (0.081)
0.909*** 1.693*** 0.727*** 0.715***
(0.226) (0.381) (0.270) (0.220)
Included Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included
0.827 0.608 0.570 0.734
* 6043.140*** 2624.299*** 3392.357*** 4318.406***
91.338*** 1053.921*** 370.127*** 149.926***
34706.11*** 6496.40*** 11011.87*** 25578.41***
48.29*** 37.16*** 37.39*** 52.57***
3,792 4,414 4,168 4,113
in parentheses. 3. ***, **, and * indicate that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
d ratio (LR1) statistic is applied to test the recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
od ratio (LR2) statistic is applied to test the recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
ecipient ﬁxed eﬀects. 6. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic is applied to
) eﬀects model over OLS. 7. The Hausman statistic is applied to test ﬁxed
ts model.
Table 2. List of countries with smallest and largest ﬁxed-eﬀect coeﬃcients based on Eqn. (8) and Standard deviations (s.d.) And correlations of ﬁxed-eﬀect coeﬃcients
Multilateral aid USA Canada France Italy Japan United Kingdom
Least favored recipients
Palau India Saudi Arabia Marshall Islands Palau Bermuda China
Bermuda Viet Nam Iran Bermuda Kiribati Bahamas India
Brunei Nigeria China Micronesia Marshall Islands Libya Congo, Dem. Rep.
Macao Iran Uzbekistan Macao Barbados Kuwait Uzbekistan
Kiribati Brazil Korea Antigua and Barbuda Tonga Cyprus Burkina Faso
Marshall Islands Indonesia India Bahamas Samoa Equatorial Guinea Philippines
Micronesia Saudi Arabia Nigeria Kiribati Dominica French Polynesia Morocco
Aruba Bangladesh Kyrgyz Republic Belize St. Kitts-Nevis Macao Brazil
French Polynesia Congo, Dem. Rep. Moldova Barbados Comoros Belarus Korea
Antigua and
Barbuda
Ethiopia Syria Palau St. Lucia New Caledonia Iran
Most favored recipients
Turkey Grenada St.Vincent &
Grenadines
Mali Tunisia Malaysia St.Vincent & Grenadines
Viet Nam Cyprus Seychelles Tunisia Morocco India Grenada
Ethiopia Bahamas Guyana Madagascar Turkey Pakistan Vanuatu
South Africa Antigua and Barbuda Belize Algeria Indonesia Korea Bermuda
Brazil Seychelles St. Lucia Cameroon Mozambique China Belize
Indonesia Israel Grenada French Polynesia Ethiopia Sri Lanka Antigua and Barbuda
Egypt St. Kitts-Nevis Bermuda Senegal India Bangladesh Kiribati
Pakistan Micronesia Barbados Morocco Argentina Thailand Dominica
Bangladesh Marshall Islands St. Kitts-Nevis New Caledonia Brazil Philippines Seychelles
India Palau Dominica Cote d’Ivoire Egypt Indonesia St. Kitts-Nevis
s.d. 2.077 3.516 2.057 2.391 2.729 1.947 3.312
United States 0.745
Canada 0.503 0.760
France 0.675 0.633 0.391
Italy 0.792 0.550 0.358 0.611
Japan 0.573 0.471 0.397 0.301 0.282
United Kingdom 0.702 0.802 0.793 0.635 0.572 0.440
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Table 1 presents the results from pooled regression (OLS)
and two-way ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression based on Eqn. (8)
for diﬀerent donors, more speciﬁcally, multilateral organiza-
tions, United States, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and United
Kingdom. Diagnostic test results indicate that the two-way
(country and year) ﬁxed eﬀects models are statistically better
models than the others. Our discussion below will, therefore,
focus on the statistically preferred two-way ﬁxed eﬀects mod-
els (least squares with recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects).
Most results of the two-way ﬁxed eﬀects models in Table 1
are in line with expectations. Coeﬃcients on growth rate
(AVEGDPG) are consistently positive and statistically signif-
icant, indicating that donors reward recipients with a good
policy environment. The coeﬃcients on GDP per capita
(LGDPPC), apart from France and Japan aid regressions,
have a negative sign and are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting
that donors (multilateral donors, United States, Canada, Italy,
and United Kingdom) respond to recipient need in their aid
allocations. This is consistent with the results of Feeny and
McGillivray (2008) who, like us, develop an aid allocation the-
oretical model for empirical testing. The magnitude on
LGDPPC is greater than 1 in the USA regression 17 which is
larger than those in other regressions, indicating once other
factors (including donor interests) are controlled for, United
States puts greater emphasis on recipient need than others.
The coeﬃcients on population (LPOP) are rather mixed.
Recipients with large population appear to attract less aid
per capita from multilateral organizations, France, Italy, and
Japan. On the other hand, those with large population seem
to receive more United States and United Kingdom aid per ca-
pita and recipient population size appears to have little impact
on Canadian aid. This suggests that aid from diﬀerent donors
exhibits diﬀerent patterns of population bias and the ﬁnding is
generally consistent with those in other aid determinants stud-
ies (e.g., Berthe´lemy & Tichit, 2004).
Although the above results suggest that most donors have
responded to good policy environment and recipient need,
we are also interested in knowing to what extent have they re-
sponded to these factors? One way to answer this question is
to look at the adjusted R2 from the OLS regressions. These
statistics explain how much variation is explained by the vari-
ables (AVEGDPG, LGDPPC and LPOP). The adjusted R2
for the multilateral aid, United States, Canada, France, Italy,
Japan, and United Kingom regressions are 0.460, 0148, 0.172,
0.192, 0.047, 0.074, and 0.274 respectively. It is clear that bilat-
eral donors put less emphasis on good policy environment andTable 3. Rankings of MENA countries according
Multilateral Aid United States Canada
Most favored to Least
favored countries
Egypt Israel Lebano
Turkey Jordan Jordan
Morocco Lebanon Tunisia
Sudan Iraq Israel
Algeria Egypt Morocc
Tunisia Tunisia Iraq
Yemen Morocco Egypt
Lebanon Turkey Algeria
Syria Yemen Sudan
Jordan Sudan Turkey
Iraq Syria Yemen
Iran Algeria Syria
Israel Iran Iran
s.d. 1.104 3.488 1.882recipient need than multilateral donors do, and United States
and Japan, the largest and second largest donors allocate a
low proportion of their aid based on good policy environment
and recipient need.
The donor–recipient speciﬁc eﬀects are of interest here since
they capture the linkages between donor and speciﬁc recipi-
ent’s which might reﬂect such factors as long term strategic
relations, economic linkages, colonial ties, geographic proxim-
ity, and culture or language similarities. If a donor puts more
weight on linkages, that is, donor interest, rather than recipi-
ent need, the standard deviation would be larger. The standard
deviation (s.d.) of the ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients is reported at the
bottom of Table 2. Among these statistics, the United States
has the higher ﬁgure suggesting that the United States places
more emphasis on the donor interest inter-linkages than other
bilateral and multilateral donors. Following the s.d., the corre-
lation matrix of ﬁxed eﬀects is given at the bottom of Table 2.
The correlations between the USA–recipients ﬁxed eﬀects,
UK–recipients ﬁxed eﬀects, and Canada-recipients ﬁxed eﬀects
are all larger than 0.75, indicating the presence of Anglo-
American relationships in aid allocation. The other three bilat-
eral donors, France, Italy, and Japan seem to distance them-
selves from the Anglo-American pact but share similar
interests to those of multilateral donors.
Since this dataset covers 153 countries, it would be very
demanding to discuss all the recipient-speciﬁc eﬀects for all
the donors. Table 2 reports the most and least favored recipi-
ents for each donor. Take the USA as an example, large posi-
tive country ﬁxed eﬀects indicate the USA favors a number of
small states including Grenada, Cyprus, Bahamas, Antigua
and Barbuda, Seychelles, Israel, St. Kitts-Nevis, Micronesia,
Marshall Islands and Palau. This is not surprising given the
extremely close relationship between the USA and Israel par-
ticularly since the signing of the Camp David Accord in the
late 1970s, and the past importance of many of the small states
in the Caribbean Basin to the USA’s ﬁght against communism
in its back yard.
As mentioned at the start of this paper, one of the motiva-
tions of our research is to speculate whether, in light of the
current War on Terror, future aid allocations, especially on
the part of the USA, are likely to become more inﬂuenced
by geo-political concerns. For example, aid ﬂows may become
more geared towards supporting pro-Western regimes in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). If we can establish
that such practices are already embedded in the geographical
allocation of aid then we can speculate that this may well
intensify in years to come. Hence, in looking at the donor
and recipient country ﬁxed eﬀects, we shall concentrate theto ﬁxed-eﬀect coeﬃcients based on Eqn. (8)
France Italy Japan United Kingdom
n Morocco Egypt Egypt Jordan
Algeria Turkey Jordan Lebanon
Tunisia Morocco Morocco Iraq
Egypt Tunisia Turkey Sudan
o Lebanon Algeria Yemen Yemen
Turkey Lebanon Tunisia Tunisia
Syria Sudan Syria Turkey
Yemen Iraq Sudan Israel
Jordan Iran Iran Egypt
Sudan Jordan Algeria Syria
Iran Yemen Lebanon Algeria
Iraq Syria Israel Iran
Israel Israel Iraq Morocco
1.486 1.467 1.767 1.930
Table 4. Aid by sources
Multilateral aid United States Canada France Italy Japan United Kingdom
AVEGDPG 0.017*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.008 0.041*** 0.022*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
AVEGDPG  DUM90 0.000 0.012 0.015 0.016** 0.027** 0.011 0.025***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
LGDPPC 0.281*** 0.790*** 0.682*** 0.095 0.308** 0.235** 0.611***
(0.071) (0.097) (0.107) (0.084) (0.140) (0.109) (0.089)
LGDPPC  DUM90 0.129*** 0.202*** 0.079* 0.073** 0.120** 0.009 0.225***
(0.028) (0.045) (0.048) (0.030) (0.054) (0.040) (0.038)
LPOP 1.336*** 0.623** 0.068 0.789*** 1.766*** 0.244 0.166
(0.181) (0.264) (0.286) (0.233) (0.398) (0.282) (0.234)
LPOP  DUM90 0.066*** 0.003 0.164*** 0.021 0.044 0.179*** 0.168***
(0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.037) (0.025) (0.022)
Recipient ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.662 0.619 0.545 0.827 0.608 0.57 0.734
Diagnostic test statistics
LR1 2309.708*** 3344.577*** 2457.859*** 6043.140*** 2624.299*** 3392.357*** 4318.406***
LR2 216.064*** 333.014*** 313.640*** 91.338*** 1053.921*** 370.127*** 149.926***
LM 6059.44*** 10491.52*** 8040.97*** 34706.11*** 6496.40*** 11011.87*** 25578.41***
HS 52.88*** 72.81*** 24.17*** 48.29*** 37.16*** 37.39*** 52.57***
N 4,503 3,915 3,792 3,792 3,293 4,168 4,113
Notes: 1. Recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported. 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. 3. ***, **, and * indicate that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 4. The likelihood ratio (LR1) statistic is applied to test the recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
versus OLS, high value favors two way eﬀects model over OLS. 5. The likelihood ratio (LR2) statistic is applied to test the recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
versus recipient ﬁxed eﬀects only, high value favors two-way eﬀects model over recipient ﬁxed eﬀects. 6. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic is applied to
test the recipient and year eﬀects versus OLS, high value favors random (&ﬁxed) eﬀects model over OLS. 7. The Hausman statistic is applied to test ﬁxed
eﬀects versus random eﬀects, high value favors ﬁxed eﬀects over random eﬀects model.
Table 5. Tests of “middle-income bias” and “Bandwagon eﬀect”
Multilateral aid United States Canada France Italy Japan United Kingdom
AVEGDPG 0.005 0.020*** 0.007 0.018*** 0.013* 0.026*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
LPOP 0.942*** 0.666*** 0.294 0.899*** 1.354*** 0.760*** 0.488**
(0.170) (0.246) (0.266) (0.223) (0.391) (0.269) (0.222)
GDPPC 0.058** 0.906*** 0.392*** 0.020 0.175*** 0.095*** 0.445***
(0.024) (0.064) (0.064) (0.033) (0.063) (0.037) (0.033)
GDPPC2 0.002*** 0.037*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001* 0.008***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
OTHER ODA 0.285*** 0.416*** 0.490*** 0.276*** 0.431*** 0.476*** 0.239***
(0.019) (0.033) (0.035) (0.023) (0.045) (0.032) (0.026)
Recipient ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.690 0.648 0.574 0.833 0.619 0.600 0.745
Diagnostic test statistics
LR1 2280.384*** 3393.676*** 2359.929*** 6169.016*** 2444.159*** 3497.848*** 4423.239***
LR2 129.682*** 344.903*** 263.609*** 96.712*** 990.235*** 374.610*** 150.665***
LM 6312.730*** 10325.560*** 7097.390*** 33332.720*** 5827.850*** 10878.290*** 26502.750***
HS 89.040*** 92.750*** 27.030*** 64.270*** 45.710*** 57.590*** 56.390***
N 4,487 3,915 3,791 3,786 3,293 4,166 4,093
Notes: 1. Recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported. 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. 3. ***, **, and * indicate that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 4. The likelihood ratio (LR1) statistic is applied to test the recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
versus OLS, high value favors two way eﬀects model over OLS. 5. The likelihood ratio (LR2) statistic is applied to test the recipient and year ﬁxed eﬀects
versus recipient ﬁxed eﬀects only, high value favors two-way eﬀects model over recipient ﬁxed eﬀects. 6. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic is applied to
test the recipient and year eﬀects versus OLS, high value favors random (&ﬁxed) eﬀects model over OLS. 7. The Hausman statistic is applied to test ﬁxed
eﬀects versus random eﬀects, high value favors ﬁxed eﬀects over random eﬀects model.
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and pay particular attention to the behavior of the USA as a
donor. The ranking of ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients for MENA
countries are given in Table 3. Donor interest, as represented
by the ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcient, has a strong positive eﬀect in the
allocation of US aid to Israel and Jordan, two of the most
strategically important US allies in the region, and a strongnegative eﬀect on US aid allocation to Iran, Sudan, and Syria,
countries traditionally hostile to US foreign policy in the re-
gion.
Next to consider is whether there are changes over time in
how aid is allocated, more speciﬁcally before and after the
Cold War. There was a sea change following the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Although time eﬀects included in the
Table 6. Probit and tobit estimation based on Eqn. (8)
Multilateral aid United States Canada France Italy Japan United Kingdom
Probit model
AVEGDPG 0.067*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.069***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
LGDPPC 1.156*** 1.096*** 1.018*** 1.109*** 0.467*** 0.511*** 0.639***
(0.125) (0.089) (0.091) (0.122) (0.069) (0.078) (0.078)
LPOP 0.338*** 0.113 0.213** 0.076 0.570*** 0.192** 0.092
(0.097) (0.070) (0.082) (0.097) (0.061) (0.063) (0.065)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
lnsig2u 0.839*** 0.733*** 0.797*** 0.837*** 0.665*** 0.660*** 0.698***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.027) (0.022) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
N 5,470 5,470 5,470 5,470 5,470 5,470 5,470
Tobit model
AVEGDPG 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.038***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
LGDPPC 0.785*** 1.237*** 0.839*** 0.095 0.993*** 0.373*** 1.081***
(0.046) (0.076) (0.088) (0.072) (0.132) (0.066) (0.088)
LPOP 0.617*** 0.418*** 0.337*** 0.484*** 0.218* 0.369*** 0.487***
(0.04) (0.074) (0.07) (0.094) (0.102) (0.06) (0.085)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
sigma_u 0.952*** 1.867*** 1.622*** 2.356*** 2.248*** 1.483*** 2.114***
(0.061) (0.123) (0.125) (0.166) (0.19) (0.098) (0.156)
sigma_e 1.073*** 1.341*** 1.302*** 1.051*** 1.616*** 1.261*** 1.347***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017) (0.042) (0.019) (0.025)
N 5,452 5,470 5,449 5,469 5,470 5,470 5,458
Notes: 1. Year ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported. 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. 3. ***, **, and * indicate that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
1290 WORLD DEVELOPMENTprevious results to some degree account for this, we have not
captured changes in the coeﬃcients on the key variables. Stra-
tegic considerations are likely to be very diﬀerent before and
after 1989. We therefore introduce a dummy variable
(DUM90) which takes value 1 for years from 1990 onwards
and interact this variable with all key variables. The results
are presented in Table 4.
We ﬁnd that support by multilateral organization, USA,
Canada and Japan to recipients with good policy environment
(AVEGDPG) has not changed before and after 1989. It is after
1989 that France has started to respond to recipient’s policy
environment. For Italy and UK, they still consider recipients’
policy environment to be an important factor in their allocation
of aid, but its importance has reduced somewhat after 1989.Do-
nors other than France and Japan consistently respond to reci-
pient need (LGDPPC). After 1989 all of these donors except
Canada have paid greater attention to recipient need than dur-
ing the ColdWar. Canada has put slightly less emphasis on this
factor, but still more than other donors except the USA. It is
clearly established earlier, there are diﬀerent degrees of popula-
tion bias for diﬀerent donors. Table 4 demonstrates multilateral
organizations, Canada, Japan and the UK have changed their
behavior after the Cold War. Multilateral donors and Japan
have given greater weight to countries with smaller population
while Canada and theUKhave started to putmore emphasis on
countries with larger population since 1989.
As discussed in Section 2, there is often a middle-income
bias in aid allocation. We now address this issue as well as
the potential “bandwagon eﬀect,” which describes the fact that
when a recipient receives more aid from one donor, this may
attract more from other donors. We replace LGDPPC with
GDP per capita (GDPPC) and the square term of GDP per ca-
pita (GDPPC2) to capture the middle-income bias eﬀect. We
include another variable, aid from other sources (OTHER
ODA), to capture the bandwagon eﬀect. The results are re-
ported in Table 5. The coeﬃcients on GDPPC are negativeand signiﬁcant and those on GDPPC2 are positive and signif-
icant in all the regressions apart from the regression for
France. This indicates that these bilateral and multilateral do-
nors display middle-income bias in the process of their aid
allocation.
The coeﬃcients on OTHER ODA are statistically signiﬁcant
and positive in all of the regressions for diﬀerent donors. This
lends support to the argument that a “bandwagon eﬀect” ex-
ists in the aid allocation process.
So far, our empirical work has only been concerned with the
countries that receive a positive amount of aid. However, as
Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) have pointed out, in reality
the process of aid allocation entails two kinds of question:
whether to allocate aid to given potential recipient, and in
the case of a positive answer, how much to give to this recipi-
ent. Ignoring this (i.e., the truncated nature of the aid variable)
may generate bias in the estimation. Responding to this com-
ment, we further run the Probit and Tobit regressions with the
random eﬀects using the same set of variables as in Table 1;
the results are given in Table 6. The ﬁndings for AVEGDPG
and LGDPPC are consistent with those in Table 1, indicating
that donors tend to respond to good policy environment and
recipient need when they decide on whether to allocate aid
and how much aid should be allocated to the recipient. How-
ever, the coeﬃcient on LPOP exhibits a diﬀerent pattern
across two-way ﬁxed eﬀects, Probit and Tobit models. Tobit
models clearly reveal population bias. But donors seem to re-
act diﬀerently to the size of recipients when deciding on
whether to allocate aid to the recipient.6. CONCLUSION
Our results indicate that both bilateral and multilateral do-
nors respond to recipient need in their allocation of foreign
aid. Poorer countries (in terms of GDP per capita) get more
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recipients. However, compared to other donors, the United
States puts less emphasis on policy environment and recipient
need—only about 14.8% of US aid is allocated on the basis of
policy environment and recipient need (and bilateral donors
care less about recipient need than multilateral donors). The
United States also places more emphasis on its own donor
interest (as represented by donor–recipient speciﬁc linkages)
than others do and in this respect behaves quite diﬀerently
from other donors. Donor interest seems to be a particularly
important aspect in the allocation of US aid to the Middle
East and North Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean
Basin—all of which have long been regarded by the United
States as geopolitically strategic regions. In short, the United
States seems to be a more selﬁsh donor than the rest in that
it pays less attention to recipient need and more attention to
its own interests when allocating its aid budget.
We feel that the above ﬁndings are important given the man-
ner in which the United States in the new millennium seems to
be articulating a view whereby American interests are increas-
ingly invoked as a justiﬁcation for aid. An important aspect of
these interests is likely to be the pursuit of the War on Terror.There is already evidence that the allocation of US aid in the
Middle East and North Africa, as well as in other strategic re-
gions, has been inﬂuenced by linkages between the United
States and recipients. Given this ﬁnding, there is reason to sus-
pect that such a practice may well intensify in the future.
We also found a “bandwagon eﬀect” in aid allocation, that
is, when a recipient receives more aid from one donor this may
attract more from other donors as well. In addition, bilateral
aid seems to display middle-income bias. Again, both of these
ﬁndings might have important implications for future aid allo-
cations give the current geopolitical climate. A skewing of US
aid toward strategically important countries, such as allies in
the MENA region, may have a similar eﬀect on aid from other
donors via the bandwagon eﬀect, and given that many such
countries are middle-income countries, this may reinforce the
middle income bias of bilateral aid allocations. An important
question, which deserves research, is whether such potential
determinants of future aid allocations will signiﬁcantly reduce
the developmental impact of global aid ﬂows. There is already
evidence (Collier & Dollar, 2002) that sub-optimal geographic
aid allocation has reduced the potential poverty alleviation im-
pact of aid.NOTES1. The countries in Mosley et al. (1987) sample are classiﬁed into four
groups: high aid, high growth; high aid, low growth; low aid, high growth
and low aid, low growth. The fact that 22 countries are classiﬁed as high
aid and low growth (i.e., aid does not seem eﬀective) and 22 are classiﬁed
as low aid and high growth (i.e., aid does not seem to be necessary) casts
doubt on aid eﬀectiveness and also illustrates the country-speciﬁc diversity
of the aid–growth relationship.
2. Aid tying occurswhen donors stipulate that part of the aid funds be used
to import goods from the donor country, often at uncompetitive prices.
3. There is ample anecdotal evidence of donor interest inﬂuencing aid
allocations. Sierra Leone and Israel were both classiﬁed as developing
countries by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in 1995 and
both had a similar population size. However, Israel is one of the United
States’s most strategically important allies. From 1969 to 1995, Sierra
Leone received an annual average of ODA of US$74 million, while Israel
received US$937 million which is roughly 13 times the amount allocated to
Sierra Leone despite the fact that Israel’s income per capita was 27 times
that of Sierra Leone.
4. Western aid to Mobuto’s Zaire or Marcos’s Philippines designed to
bolster pro-western anti-communist regimes are good examples.
5. See Mosley et al. (1987) for a discussion of political and commercial
pressures for the diﬀusion of aid allocation; See Hjertholm and White
(2000) for the evidence of aid diﬀusion among countries.
6. It is worth noting here that the population or the middle-income biases
may not be free from incentives based either on the recipient’s need or on
the donor’s interest. This is important, since it matters in hypotheses
testing and results interpretation. For example, Wittkopf (1972) treats
population as an indicator of political importance, unlike others who treat
it as an indicator of recipient’s need. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) put
population in a recipient’s need model while dropping it from their donor
interest model.
7. The diﬀerence between the ﬁxed-eﬀects and random eﬀects is that
individual eﬀect is speciﬁed as a group speciﬁc constant term in the former,while as a group speciﬁc disturbance in the later. Unlike the random-
eﬀects model, the error term in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model is assumed to be
heteroskedastic and free of autocorrelation. In the case of aid allocation
studies, a Tobit model that allows country-speciﬁc eﬀects and takes
account of the censored nature of the dependent variable may be
preferred.
8. In their attempt to assess the robustness and credibility of empirical
results obtained in the literature, McGillivray and White (1993) provided a
thorough critical assessment of the methodological properties of various
statistical models adopted in those studies. Some of their recommenda-
tions for improvement of the methodology include using aid commitments
instead of aid disbursement as the dependent variable, avoiding separate
recipient need and donor interest in models, and giving consideration to
the limited dependent variable and non-random sample selection issues.
9. Feeny and McGillivray (2008) develop an aid allocation model in
which aid is treated as a private good of a donor country bureaucratic
group responsible for bilateral aid allocation. The model is applied to time
series data for 10 principal recipients of bilateral oﬃcial development
assistance. Like us, they ﬁnd that both recipient need and donor interest
variables determine the amount of foreign aid to developing countries.
They also ﬁnd that donor allocation behavior often diﬀers markedly
among recipients.
10. In this model, a given donor will grant a positive amount of aid to
every country.
11. Note, though
@hj
@nj
< 0,
@Hj
@nj
< 0
12. Each individual’s welfare change is 1 + a + c < 0. This condition
ensures that aid is not a simple cash transfer that substitutes for productive
eﬀort.
13. When the total aid to a country is given, holding pj and yj constant,
the marginal impact of population is 1  a  b.
14. Hummels and Levinsoh (1995) use the same approach to capture
OECD countries’ speciﬁc trade relationships.
1292 WORLD DEVELOPMENT15. In other empirical work on aid allocation, the growth rate is
interpreted as the absorptive capacity. Although diﬀerences exist between
the two concepts, it is often the case the better policy environment is, the
more eﬃciently the additional resource can be utilized and therefore the
larger the absorptive capacity.
16. According to 2008 DAC Multilateral Aid Report, the overarching
aim of multilateral aid is to reduce poverty though each agency may work
on a set of functional areas.
17. Only one measure of recipient need, income per capita, is included
here. It should be noted another variable capturing recipient need, infant
mortality, has also been found to be important in the literature (e.g.,
Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2007, chap. 19; Trumbull & Wall, 1994).However, in our sample, the correlation between GDP per capita and
infant mortality is 0.70. This is a clear indication of multicollinearity, as
a result, they cannot be introduced into the regressions simultaneously.
We, therefore, run regressions with one being included each time. The
results are qualitatively similar for common variables LPOP and AVE-
GDPG. As for Mortality, in OLS without ﬁxed eﬀects models, the variable
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all cases except Japan. However,
in two-way ﬁxed eﬀects models, only the coeﬃcient in the USA regression
is consistent with our expectation and the rest either have the wrong sign
or are statistically insigniﬁcant. Further analysis reveals that Mortality is
highly correlated with country ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore, in the paper, we
focus on GDP per capita only. The results for Mortality are available upon
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MORTALITY Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births).
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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
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